Contrary to popular superstition, AES 128 is just fine in a post-quantum world

Experts argue the widely held belief that quantum computers will break AES-128 encryption is a dangerous misconception impeding security planning. | Contesto: cronaca

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• Contrary to popular superstition, AES 128 is just fine in a post-quantum world

Contesto

Contrary to a pervasive and persistent industry superstition, the widely used AES-128 encryption standard remains secure against the threat of future quantum computers, a stance that challenges the foundational assumptions of many post-quantum readiness programs. This conclusion, drawn from detailed cryptographic analysis, suggests that a critical misconception is actively hampering efforts to prepare critical digital infrastructure for the quantum era, diverting resources and attention from systems that are genuinely vulnerable. The core of the misconception lies in a fundamental misunderstanding of how quantum computers attack different types of encryption. Grover's algorithm, the primary quantum method for attacking symmetric-key ciphers like AES, provides only a quadratic speedup. For AES-128, this effectively halves its security strength to 64 bits, a level that remains computationally infeasible to breach with any foreseeable quantum hardware. Experts emphasize that doubling the key size to AES-256 effortlessly restores a massive security margin, making the symmetric encryption used in everything from web traffic to disk storage a manageable, rather than existential, quantum concern. The real and urgent quantum threat, analysts stress, targets public-key cryptography—the systems like RSA and Elliptic Curve that underpin digital signatures and key exchange protocols. These are vulnerable to Shor's algorithm, which can break them in polynomial time, rendering current methods completely obsolete. The conflation of these two distinct threats has led to a blanket, often alarmist, message that "all encryption will be broken," creating unnecessary panic around protocols like TLS and VPNs that rely on AES, while potentially understating the catastrophic collapse awaiting the public-key infrastructure that secures digital identities and transactions. This misdirected focus has tangible consequences for organizations navigating the complex transition to post-quantum cryptography. Budgets and engineering efforts are being allocated based on flawed risk assessments. Companies may prioritize upgrading AES-128 connections—a change requiring significant bandwidth and...

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Categoria: cronaca