"TotalRecall Reloaded" tool finds a side entrance to Windows 11's Recall database
Security researchers bypass Windows 11 Recall's encryption, accessing sensitive user data through an unsecured application process.
Security researchers bypass Windows 11 Recall's encryption, accessing sensitive user data through an unsecured application process. | Contesto: cronaca
Punti chiave
- "TotalRecall Reloaded" tool finds a side entrance to Windows 11's Recall database
Contesto
Security researchers have demonstrated a method to access the sensitive database created by Windows 11's new Recall feature, bypassing its advertised encryption protections. The tool, dubbed "TotalRecall Reloaded," exploits a side channel in the system's architecture, allowing unauthorized access to a detailed log of a user's on-screen activity. This development, confirmed by independent analysis of the tool's code, directly challenges Microsoft's assurances that the locally-stored Recall data is secure. Recall, a flagship AI feature for upcoming Copilot+ PCs, is designed to take constant screenshots of a user's desktop, creating a searchable, photographic memory of everything seen on the computer. Microsoft has consistently stated that this data is encrypted and stored solely on the user's device. However, the researchers behind TotalRecall Reloaded illustrate a critical flaw in this security model. They argue that while the encrypted database itself—the "vault"—may be robust, the process that delivers data to and from it is vulnerable. The core of the exploit lies in the decrypted state of the data. When the Recall feature is active, the screenshots and their processed text are decrypted from the database to be displayed to the user within the Recall application. The TotalRecall Reloaded tool intercepts this data stream. It does not crack the database encryption but instead accesses the information after it has been decrypted for use, effectively finding an open side door while the main vault door remains locked. This vulnerability has profound implications for user privacy and device security. A malicious actor with local access to a PC—either physically or through malware—could use this method to extract a complete history of a user's actions, including passwords, private messages, financial documents, and visited websites, all from what was promised to be a secure, local system. The situation is exacerbated by Recall's default "on" setting for most users, meaning the feature would be capturing this data without explicit, informed consent to the specific risks now revealed. The discovery forces a re-evaluation of the threat model for AI-powered features...
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Decisione di validazione: publish
Risk score: 0.1
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Categoria: cronaca